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IN QUEST OF A DOCTRINE: 
CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION1





On the instance of theoretical dilemmas, which have been opened in the Cro-
atian legal community by its entrance into the European legal system, the issues 
of a constitutional identity have been treated in the paper. There still exist ten-
dencies of equalizing the federal principle with a federative state, and consequ-
ently rejecting federalism as a viable principle. In a combination with the two 
erroneous ideological interpretations of the European Union, whether as a system 
dominated by a self-serving bureaucracy, or opposite, as a community founded on 
a faith and altruism, they emphasize the importance of a proper understanding 
of the notion of constitutional identity. Among other meanings of constitutional 
identity, there is the one of a ‘remnant sovereignty’ in a compound community of 
states. To that purpose it is important, though neglected, to construe a new legal 
theory with an aim to strengthen the rule of law, as well as to delineate realistic 
principles of primacy of European law over the national constitution. Such a the-
ory cannot be established upon a pure legalism, but only on an interdisciplinary 
approach, which would take into account a whole array of extrajudicial factors 
which determinate dynamics of relationships within a complex system of plural 
constitutionality of the Union. There must not be forgotten the achievements of the 
federalist theory, which had permeated the ideas of the founders of the European 
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integrations. The erroneous actions of the Croatian government and the dispute 
with the European Commission at the very beginning of the membership have 
demonstrated the necessity of such a realistic theory of constitutional identity. 
Since there exists a lot of confusion on the matter in other countries as well, the 
problems of the newest member state might be of significance for further clarifica-
tions to other members. 
Keywords: European Union, constitutional identity, pure legalism, federal 
principle, federation, compound community, Croatia
Introduction
“Where	there	is	constitutional	law,	there	must	also	be	constitutional	theory;	
and constitutional theory is necessarily rooted in the vision of the constitutio-
nal	state	as	being	or	aspiring	to	be	a	moral	order.”2 Such a theory has not been 
formulated	within	the	Croatian	legal	community	at	its	full	membership	in	the	
European Union. We look at the issues of a constitutional identity of the Union 
members from a viewpoint of the newest member, one among the smaller states, 
and a former communist autocracy, with no established tradition of the rule of 
law. It has a centuries long experience of living within the various compound 
communities of states.3 In our view thus, the membership in the European Uni-
on would require further adaptations to the requirements of the constitutional 
principle	rule	of	law,	which	should	in	turn	be	properly	understood	by	the	Cro-
atian legal community elite. The stress on ‘a	proper	understanding’	accentuates	
importance of a realistic perception of the terms and conditions, under which 
a small and economically weak new member could establish a lasting mutually 
productive relationships with the other members as well as the bodies of the 




2	 Neil	McCormick	quoted	by	Ola	Zetterquist:	The EU Constitution Viewed in Light of 




of the statehood had never been disavowed.
4 Branko Smerdel: Constitutional Identity Within the European Union: a View From the 
Courts and Beyond,	Jean	Monnet	conference	“National	and	Constitutional	Identity	in	
EU	Law”	held	at	the	Regensburg	University,	Regensburg,	Germany,	March	22,	2012.
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for example, does it establish a presidential or parliamentary system, a unitary 
or	federal	state	—	to	the	relation	between	the	constitution	and	the	culture	in	
which it operates, and to the relation between the identity of the constitution 
and other relevant identities, such as national, religious, or ideological iden-
tity”,	writes	M.	Rosenfeld.5 
In	the	EU	law,	it	has	been	driven	from	the	Article	4(2)	Treaty	on	the	EU:	
“The	Union	 shall	 respect	 (Member	 States’)	 national	 identities,	 inherent	 in	
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional 
and	local	self-government”.	There	have	been	controversies	about	such	questi-
ons as to what is that what the Union should respect. Whether and in what 
way this ‘respect’	can	entail	a	restriction	of	the	primacy	of	EU	law,	what	this	
‘identity’	precisely	consists	of,	and	who	is	competent	to	decide	on	its	interpre-
tation and application. In our view the core of the concept refers to certain 
principles of the national constitutions. It can refer to different notions of 
‘identity’:	 firstly,	 to	 that	which	 essentially	makes	 the	 constitution	 (and	 the	
state it governs) into what it is, and secondly, to that in which a constitution 
(and the state it governs) is different from (some) other constitutions. But it 
might also mean the limits of the community authority over the legal system 
of a member state and in particular its constitution.6 Lately, it has even been 
treated as an obstacle in a study ordered by a directorate for political matters 
of the European Parliament.7
In	 this	paper,	we	 consider	 it	 in	 the	 sense	of	 “a	 remnant	 sovereignty”	of	
Croatia	within	the	European	Union.8 From the constitutional point of view 
it	 has	 been	 the	most	 important	 one,	 regarding	 the	 Croatian	 constitutional	
tradition. For instance, as an etymological consequence of its ‘con-federalist’	
experiences,	 the	 very	Croatian	 term	 for	 the	 constitution	 (ustav), brings the 
5	 Michel	Rosenfeld:	Constitutional Identity,	 in:	Michael	Rosenfeld	 and	András	Sajó	
(eds.):	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Comparative	Constitutional	Law,	Oxford	Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 756.
6	 For	various	meanings	of	the	notion,	see	Alejandro	Saiz	Arnaiz	and	Carina	Alcoberro	
Llivina (eds.): National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, 
Cambridge,	2013.
7 European Parliament: National Constitutional Avenues for Future European Integration, 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies, accessed on	March	11,	2014.	 
8	 “Considered	solved	 in	 the	part	of	 legal	 literature,	 the	 issue	 reappeared	due	 to	 the	
economic	austerity	measures	in	the	eurozone.”	Oliver Gerstenberg: An End to European 
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connotations to the barriers aimed outwards, towards a foreign center, and 
the	stronger	partners.	Much	less	 it	aims	to	protection	of	 its	citizens	against	
their own governments, like in the Western Europe and Scandinavia. Since 
such a tradition has been shared with a number of countries, we hold that the 
Croatian	instance	might	unearth	some	issues	which	are	worth	of	greater	future	
scholarly attention.
Croatian	membership	 in	 the	 European	Union	 has	 been	 achieved	 during	
the painstaking and lengthy process of negotiation and accession, which de 
facto had lasted twelve years, since the fundamental constitutional choice was 
made	by	entering	into	force	of	the	Stabilization	and	Accession	Treaty	of	2001.	
The full membership accentuates the importance of a well justified theoretical 
position	on	the	part	of	the	Croatian	legal	community,	towards	the	issues	of	
its constitutional identity within the compound community of states. Such 
a theory still has not been formulated let alone being widely accepted. The 
events	which	immediately	followed	the	celebration	of	full	membership	on	July	
1, 2013 have demonstrated that the caveats of this kind, however scarce, have 
been founded on a rather justified apprehension of possible consequences of 
the integration of the two different legal cultures: the ‘transitional’	or	lenient	
one	and	the	established	or	the	strict	one,	on	the	part	of	the	Commission.9 
In our view, such a theory should be established upon a strict respect of 
the conventional obligations and the whole acquis communautaire, meaning the 
written	 sources	 of	 law	 as	well	 as	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 European	Court.	 But	
also, it is important to emphasize, this should be understood as a relationship 
between partners, bound by the mutual commitment to duties and responsi-
bilities established by the law. The rights and obligations should be grounded 
upon a correct understanding of the established limits, both to the national 
constitution and to the regulatory authority of the European Union.10 By no 
means, the relationship should continue in the spirit of subserviently following 
the demands of European officials. Such a relation had been established during 
the years of negotiations, whereas representatives of the candidate have been 
expected to strictly follow a dictate of European experts. This means a right to 
estimate the national interest and use of legal means in its promotion and, if 
9 Theodore Konstadinides: Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The Euro-
pean Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement,	Cambridge	
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needed, the use of legal remedies when so needed. To paraphrase, this means 
to	construct	a	justifiable	bridge	between	the	Croatian	legal	community	and	the	
others in the European Union.11 In order to be able to take such a position, 
Croatian	legal	elite	should	have	developed	a	coherent	theory	of	constitutional	
identity in relationships with the European Union bodies.12 This is the reason 
why	we	have	pleaded	earlier	 in	 favor	of	 the	 “euro-realist”	 as	different	 from	
“euro-idealist”	approach	to	the	issues	of	legal	life	and	processes	within	such	a	
compound community of states.13 To construct a constitutional theory, one 
must understand the meaning of constitutionality for democracy.
Pure legalism and its limitations
An	exclusive	 legal	approach	has	at	all	 times	been	appealing	 for	Croatian	
constitutional scholars and proponents of a ‘pure’	legal	theory,	because	it	does	
not require a profound insight into the reality of application.14 However, it 
carries serious risks for an explanatory capacity of such theories. First, the nor-
mative is considered to be real. Second, the case-law is a priori considered to 
be an exclusive indicator of the real state of things. Third, political conditions 
are	 considered	 irrelevant.	Neither	 of	 these	 postulates	 is	 true.	 Jurisprudence	
enlightens only a small part of reality. The same goes for positive legislation on 
the books, which might be very distant from the rules at work. Let alone the 
constitutions which often remain ‘semantic’	and	sometimes	even	‘a	shame’.15 
We believe that only an interdisciplinary approach might explain the new po-
11	 Michel	Rosenfeld:	The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, Routledge, London and 
New	York,	2010,	as	for	the	EU	see	pp.	172	–	179.	




13 Branko Smerdel: Primjena federalnog načela i pouke ustavnih amandmana iz 1971. (Ap-
plication of the federal principle and lessons of the 1971 constitutional amendments), in: 
Branko	Smerdel	(ed.):	Primjena	federalnog	načela	i	pouke	ustavnih	amandmana	iz	
1971.,	Pravni	fakultet	u	Zagrebu	i	Centar	Miko	Tripalo,	Zagreb,	2007,	pp.	17	–	38.
14 That approach had enabled a majority of constitutionalists of former Yugoslavia to 
praise the system as the most advanced democracy in the world. The small minority 
who dared to challenge were considered dissidents. By the fall of communism, whole 
libraries become useless and numerous authors avoided to mention their previous 
volumes. One among them did not hesitate instantly to declare all of them mistaken.
15	 David	S.	Law	and	Mila	Versteeg:	The Sham Constitutions,	California	Law	Review,	
Vol.	101,	No.	4,	2013,	pp.	863	–	952.
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sition	of	Croatia	being	 finally	a	member	of	a	complex	association	of	 states.	
We	must	turn	to	the	Croatian	as	well	as	the	European	historical	experience.	
This requires us to reconsider the history of federal integrations in order to 
understand how various forms of federal and con-federal associations appear, 
operate and develop, and why some of them succeed, the other disintegrate 
consensually and rather decently, although suffering great economic setbacks, 
while the others collapse in tragedies of armed conflicts and wars.







on, on the grounds of a de facto authority.17 There appeared ever more numerous 
works in that spirit as the date of full membership had approached. It is hard 
to oppose the majority on political issues, even if it was just in order to stress 
the	importance	of	the	national	Constitution.	Only	a	few	constitutional	scho-
lars share our conviction that the importance of national constitutions raises 
in complex associations of states such as the European Union. In order even to 
attempt to formulate ‘a	doctrine’,	we	must	understand	not	only	the	legal	natu-
re, but a real operation of the complex system of the European Union as well.18 
We have strongly defended the claims to maintain and further develop the 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of comparative constitutionalism.19 This 
16	 See	the	document	cited	in	note	7.	Fn	617	cites	the	in	depth	study	of	Croatia	at	pp.	
43	–	44.
17 Siniša Rodin: Hrvatsko i pravo EU godinu dana prije članstva u EU-u (Croatian and 
European Law one Year before Accession to the EU),	 in:	 Slaven	 Ravlić	 et al. (eds.): 
Hrvatska	u	EU:	Kako	dalje?,	Centar	Miko	Tripalo,	Zagreb,	2010,	p.	 8;	Tamara	
Ćapeta	and	Siniša	Rodin:	Osnove prava Europske Unije (Introduction to the law of the 
European Union),	Narodne	novine,	Zagreb,	2011,	pp.	53	–	58.	
18	 The	uninformed	and	controversial	actions	of	the	Croatian	government	during	the	





19 Branko Smerdel: Ustavno uređenje europske Hrvatske (Constitutional Order of the Europe-
an Croatia),	Narodne	novine,	Zagreb,	2013,	pp.	228	–	229.
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is	why	we	gladly	support	the	Canadian	writer	Ron	Hirschl	who	writes:	“In	all	
of this, a simple yet powerful insight is often overlooked: constitutions neither 
originate nor operate in a vacuum. Their import cannot be meaningfully des-
cribed or explained independent of the social, political, and economic forces, 




as significant to understanding the constitutional universe as jurisprudential 
and	prescriptive	analyses.	Any	attempt	to	portray	the	constitutional	domain	
as a predominantly legal, rather than imbued in the social or political arena, is 
destined to yield thin, a-historical, overly doctrinal or formalistic accounts of 
the	origins,	nature	and	consequences	of	constitutional	law.	From	Montesquieu	
and	Weber	 to	Douglass	North	and	Robert	Dahl,	prominent	 social	 thinkers	
who have engaged in a systematic study of constitutional law and institutions 
across polities and through the ages have accepted this plain (and possibly 
inconvenient)	 truth.”20 In a word, the constitutional concept and thus the 




by law and encompasses overall political institutions and processes.21
The new ideology and its weaknesses
There has been a lot of praise in favor of the European integrations, and in 
our opinion, the most of that for more than justified reasons.22 But there had 
been even more exaggerations. During the accession process the ideology of a 
new	type	of	community	had	been	produced	in	Croatia.	This	approach	domina-
20 Ron Hirschl: From comparative constitutional law to comparative constitutional studies, 
International	Journal	of	Constitutional	Law,	Vol.	11,	No.	1,	2013,	pp.	1	–	12.	
21	 András	Sajó	in	Limiting Government	(CEU	Press,	Budapest,	1999)	demonstrates	the	
primordial importance of such a limitation after the overthrow of an autocratic 
regime.	But	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	“a	democratic	deficit”	which	has	been	
strengthened since Laeken Declaration. 
22	 Nobel	 prize	 for	 peace,	 granted	 to	 the	 EU	 in	 2012,	 reminded	 us	 to	 its’	 greatest	
achievements:	 peace	 and	 prosperity.	 And	 in	 the	 right	moment,	 since	 those	 had	
become taken for granted by the younger generations.
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ted at the opening of the new century and had brought much disappointment 
even in some old, core countries. Excessive expectations spread in all the new 
members to whom their power elites promised a rapid improvement of the life 
conditions. We have considered it even more risky in our country, regarding 
its recent bitter experiences, both with ideology and federalism.23 
There has also been a lot of criticism against the European Union, which 
have been much louder during the last years of crises, in particular in the coun-
tries much dependent of the European aid or bailout from bankruptcy. 
We	have	 been	 constantly	 warning	 against	 this	 kind	 of	 propaganda:	 “…	
considering the widely shared belief that we are applying to join a ‘new type 
of	 association’,	 in	which	dominate	 ‘European	values’,	 high	moral	principles	
and pure altruism. Such associations of states have never existed, even though 
many had claimed to be of such a kind. We had already lived in one of such 
self-proclaimed ‘new	types	of	association’,	and	we	should	not	leave	this	histo-
rical	experience	to	oblivion.	Nonetheless,	there	exist	rationally	organized	asso-
ciations founded upon the idea of legal equality of member states of unequal 
economic and political power. This might be the only guarantee of their sur-
vival and development of such communities. In such associations, nothing is 
gained	 effortlessly,	 so	 one’s	 own	 interests	 should	be	 thoughtfully	 evaluated	
and protected in accordance with the principle of equality of members. The 
community’s	constitution,	along	with	the	constitutions	of	its	member	states	is	
the	only	basis	of	such	equality.”24 
The Union has indeed been created in a way that knows no precedent in 
history, and it has already enabled several decades of progress in peace. But the 
relations within it must be interpreted correctly. They are relations of power 
sharing, with the emphasis on economic power and size of population but not 
on	infamous	“number	of	divisions”.25 However, the nature of politics has not 
changed, and a reliance on constitutional law makes the best guarantee. States 
have interests, and their friendships and loyalties depend on those. The con-
stitution is intended to protect interests of the nation, as well as of the people 
23 Branko Smerdel: Hrvatska ustavnost u Europskoj uniji - Apel eurorealista (Croatian Con-
stitutionality in the European Union - Appeal from a eurorealist), Studia lexicographica, 
Vol. 8, 2011, pp. 5 – 16;	Branko	Smerdel:	Hrvatski Ustav u Europskoj Uniji (Croatian 
Constitution in the European Union),	Hrvatska	pravna	revija,	Vol.	12,	No.	9,	2012,	pp.	
1	–	8.
24 Smerdel, op. cit.	(fn	19),	pp.	596	–	597.
25	 Atributed	to	Soviet	dictator	Stalin,	as	a	challenge	to	the	authority	of	the	Pope.	
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and of individuals. The constitution is also an instrument of legitimizing actu-
al power. In emergency situations, constitutional niceties are replaced by di-
rect	actions.	Being	explicitly	prescribed	or	considered	as	“implied	powers”,	the	
rules of emergency apply, whilst decisions are made and enforced instantly, 
only subsequently being submitted to the parliaments for approval.
The EU is unique in its approach to enlargement. The acceptance of new 
members differentiates from all known alliances of states. In his classic work, 
William Riker asserts that federal associations have historically always been 
an instrument of imperial enlargement under the domination of certain hege-
mons.26 Indeed, never in history has there been an alliance of states that has 
prepared and monitored candidates for membership so thoroughly. The EU itse-
lf have prepared and monitored any candidate thoroughly as it had done with 
Croatia.	It	seems	rather	obvious	that	the	monitoring	system	has	by	no	means	
been efficient. We still consider the efficiency of the system of harmonization of 
legislation to be an experiment.27 Instead of excessive ideological expectations, 
a historically grounded and developed federalist theory can make use of ‘sober 
expectations’	to	point	to	the	objective	options	as	well	as	the	methods	of	insuring	
(even defending) our interests in complex associations of states. 
Constitutional principles in crises
Complex	alliances,	established	on	a	federal	principle	have	their	purpose	and	
historical justification. The tendency to neglect the main sources and reasons 
for the creation of European communities, properly expressed in the formula: 
peace and prosperity. The claim of the Laeken Declaration on the future of 
the	European	Union	of	2001,	that	the	EU	is	a	“success	story”	was	justified	by	
the fact that integrations have sustained full six decades of peaceful economic 
progress, based on new principles that excluded the use of force.28 Historical 
26 William Riker: Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little, Brown, Boston, 
1964,	p.	24;	Branko	Smerdel:	Američke teorije federalizma (American Theories of Feder-
alism),	in:	Vincent	Ostrom:	Politička	teorija	složene	republike	(Political Theory of a 
Compound Republic), Informator, Zagreb, 1989, p. 7.   
27 From the time of symmachies and sympolities of	ancient	Greece	wherein	the	alliance	
hegemons used military power to enlarge the association, to the United States of 
America	which	added	acquisition	of	 territory	 (Louisiana,	Alaska)	 to	 its	 tradition	
of	military	measures	(New	Mexico),	the	policy	of	enlargement	has	been	guided	by	
utilization of historical opportunities and postponed (if at all) the harmonization 
of legislation and integration for later.
28 The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union from 2001 opens 
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memory is pale, and many today are inclined to ignore those original ideas, 
so they talk of a purely economic European association. However, the most 
important	at	the	time,	obviously	was	to	ensure	“peace	and	development”.
European integration was initially and profoundly motivated by political 
reasons, as a process of forming a political association and thereby as a means 
of ensuring peace and progress in the European continent that was historically 
ripped apart by endless wars. The perspective of peaceful development is the 
main	reason	that	we	adamantly	support	Croatia’s	efforts	in	joining	the	Uni-
on.29 The Laeken Declaration also proposes that the European Union stands 
at a crossroads unprecedented in its history. The authors conclude that to pre-
serve	this	history	as	a	“success	story”,	it	was	necessary	to	make	certain	impor-
tant decisions on how to respond to three basic problems: first, a challenge of 
democratic	deficit	within	the	Union;	second,	Europe’s	new	role	in	a	globalized	
world;	third,	European	citizens’	expectations	with	regard	to	decision-making	
and policy enforcement in the Union. 
In order to understand a magnitude of this task one must consider the fact 
that struggles for dominance within political associations make its necessary 
and unavoidable part. Tendencies of abuse of power are always possible in po-
litical process. Institutional solutions aim to reduce the destructive potential 
of such tendencies to prevail, which is they seek to streamline interest-moti-
vated conflicts towards a constructive and compromising direction. The pro-
blems that led to the breakup of many national federations, and that generally 
endanger the survival of complex states are significantly caused by aspirations 
towards centralization and dominance, rather than by attempts to build suffi-
ciently flexible constitutional solutions that would prevent such domination. 
Conflicting	interests	and	thus	permanent	cleavages	have	been,	and	will	re-
main a part of the political process in the European Union. Tensions between 
old and new members, large and small states, those economically developed 
and underdeveloped, agricultural and industrial and so forth, are constantly 
taking	place	within	 the	Union	and	are	being	 resolved.	Asymmetric	arrange-
ments have already been created, primarily by limiting free movement of wor-
kers from the new into the old Union members. The federalist spirit, capability 
for	negotiation	and	advocating	one’s	own	interests	while	acknowledging	the	
with the constatation that the European Union stands at a crossroads unprecedent-
ed in its history. 
29	 Cf.	a	survey	in:	Richard	Mayne	and	John	Pinder	with	John	C.	de	V.	Roberts:	Federal 
Union: The Pioneers, A History of Federal Union,	MacMillan,	London,	1990.
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interests of others are of crucial importance for a successful harmonization 
of various interests in complex associations of states. The failure of federalist 
solutions in the Yugoslav federation as well as in many others does not ju-
stify a rejection of federalist theory. In order to be prepared for life in such a 
community, we need federalist theory. Without it, I am afraid we are in for 
new disappointments.30 
In alliances of states constitutional law is the only protection and pillar 
of the smaller and weaker members. Even in grave circumstances of serious 
infractions	and	violations,	it	remains	“the	law”,	and	is	this	potentially	realized	
as soon as the circumstances change.31
The	European	Commission’s	White	Paper	on	good	governance32 confirmed 
the	two	important	conclusions	reached	by	scientific	literature:	first,	“that	the	
political decision-making process in the Union is so complex that very few or-
dinary Europeans have a basic knowledge of it, or can with certainty say who 
is	responsible	for	policies	being	implemented”,	and	secondly	“that	there	basic	
is little knowledge of how efficiently European legislation is really enforced 
throughout the European Union... while there is a general opinion that enfor-
cement	is	far	from	uniformity	and	perfection”.33
A	discussion	 on	 the	White	 Paper	 concluded	 that	 citizens	 feel	 estranged	
from	the	 institutions	and	political	decision-making	 in	 the	Union’s	 instituti-
ons, and that the voter turnout to elections for the European Parliament is in 
30 Daniel Halberstam: Federalism: theory, policy, law,	in:	Michel	Rosenfeld	and	András	
Sajó	 (eds.),	 The	Oxford	Handbook	 of	Comparative	Constitutional	 Law, Oxford 
University	Press,	Oxford,	2012,	pp.	582	–	605.	But	see	also	Daniel	Elazar:	Explor-
ing Federalism,	The	University	of	Alabama	Press,	Tuscaloosa,	 1987,	 and	Vincent	
Ostrom: The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Designing the American Experiment, 
3rd	ed.,	with	Barbara	Allen,	Lexington	Books,	Plymouth,	2008.	
31 See the eight concluding theses on the theory of federalism in Thomas Fleiner and 
Lidija Basta Fleiner: Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalized World, 
Springer,	Heidelberg,	2009,	pp.	587	–	593.
32	 European	 Governance	 –	 A	 White	 Paper,	 COM	 (2001)	 428	 final,	 Bruxelles,	
25.07.2001.	See	 also	Governance	 team,	Consultations	 conducted	 for	 the	prepa-
ration of the White Paper on democratic European governance - Report to the 
Commission,	June	2001,	SG/8533/01-EN,	that	demonstrates	the	working	method	
employed and the width of sources consulted. 
33	 Michael	Gallagher,	Michael	Laver	and	Peter	Mair:	Representative Government in Mod-
ern Europe, 3rd	 ed.,	McGraw	Hill,	 Boston,	 2001,	 pp.	 125	 and	 131.	 Instead	 of	 a	
scientific verification, this extremely important assertion (which I have often quot-
ed)	has	been	dramatically	confirmed	by	“revelations”	of	false	financial	reports	of	a	
number of states and by the crisis of the past five years! 
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decline, that decision-making processes are complicated, too slow and non-
transparent, that the existing legal system is too complex for an efficient imple-
mentation and that the very application of fundamental principles on which 
the Union is founded, such as solidarity and subsidiarity, requires repeated 
questioning and improvement in order to be applied in a consistent manner. 
Functionalism itself requires evaluation on the basis of the mentioned precepts 
of	“good	governance”.34
At	 the	beginning	of	 the	millennium,	 the	European	Union	was	preparing	
for strategic decisions. The Laeken declaration on the future of the European 
Union from 2001 opens with the assertion that the European Union stands 
at a crossroads unprecedented in its history. The authors conclude that this 
history	is	a	“success	story”,	but	it	is	necessary	to	make	important	decisions	on	
how to respond to three basic problems: first, a democratic challenge within 
the	union;	second,	Europe’s	new	role	in	a	globalized	world;	third,	European	
citizens’	expectations	with	regard	to	decision-making	and	policy	enforcement	
in the European Union. The basic direction of reforming political institutions 
is indicated in the form of a demand for greater democracy, transparency and 
efficiency in the way institutions work. This opens up some constitutional 
issues: from the need to simplify the legal system based on three fundamental 
international	treaties,	through	a	division	of	competences	between	the	Member	
States and the Union, to the structure of Union bodies and their powers as well 
as mechanisms of decision-making, majority required for reaching decisions, 
that	is,	the	states’	rights	of	veto	in	certain	areas	of	common	policy.	Neither	of	
these issues has been resolved, nor has the basis for gradual resolution of these 
key and chronic problems been formed.35 Only those who readily confuse the 
words on paper with the reality of the actual relationship between decision-
making and political power can claim to the contrary.







35 The failure of the constitutional convention was predictable to an attentive re-
searcher	–	 cf. Branko Smerdel: Temeljni problemi ustavnog izbora u Europskoj Uniji – 
Pokušaj preliminarne prosudbe rezultata Konvencije o budućnosti Europe (Basic Problems of 
Constitutional Choice in the European Union – An Attempt at a Preliminary Assessment 
of the Results of the Convention on the Future of Europe), Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u 
Zagrebu,	Vol.	53,	No.	3-4,	2003,	pp.	509	–	527.
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It is gradually becoming obvious that an appearance of periodical crises 
is	 in	 fact	a	 regularity	of	 the	European	politics.	 “We	would	be	hard	pressed	
to find a historical period of peaceful development that was crisis-free. True, 
many dream of it, but prolonged periods of peace have always relied on a dyna-
mic balance of opposing forces, with an ever present danger of escalation of 
conflict.”36 The famous legal historian recognized the advent of an enormous 
crisis	of	the	legal	system	of	the	West:	“The	crisis...is	not	merely	a	crisis	in	legal	
philosophy	but	also	a	crisis	in	law	itself.	Almost	all	the	nations	of	the	West	are	
threatened today by a cynicism about the law, leading to contempt for law, 
on the part of all classes of the population. The cities have become increasin-
gly unsafe. The welfare system has almost broken down under unenforceable 





lost its historical and philosophical roots and is blown about by every wind of 
fashionable	doctrine.”37 
Berman was criticized for haste in his prediction of system crises and bre-
akdowns.	It	appears	that	this	stems	from	a	jurist’s,	even	legal	historian’s,	aspi-
ration towards a harmonious world of self-contained hierarchy of norms. But, 
as	has	been	stated	many	times,	the	European	Union’s	development	unfolds	in	
an interminable succession of crisis situations that appear ever more serious.38 
36 Henry Kissinger: A World Restored: Metternich, Castelreagh and Restoration of Peace 
1812–1822,	Houghton-Miflin,	Boston,	1960,	and	Henry	Kissinger:	American Policy 
and Preventive War,	Yale	Review,	Vol.	44,	March	1955,	pp.	321	ff.
37	 Harold	J.	Berman:	Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 
Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	(Mass.),	1983,	pp.	39	–	41.
38	 This	is	how	J.	H.	H.	Weiler	summarizes	the	basic	characteristics:	“What,	then,	are	









continent?”	By	concluding	that	it	is	the	Maastricht	Treaty	that	“cross[es] the line 
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We could, therefore, establish with full responsibility that control mecha-
nism is a necessity, that is, a mode of functioning of the relations in complex 
international	integrations	demands	a	contingency	planning.	Nevertheless,	po-
litical and economic crises are certainly much preferable to armed confrontati-
ons. Instead of weapons, negotiations and the law should resolve the conflicts. 
Therefore, it is certainly imprudent to give up the constitutional identity by 
stressing	unconditionally	the	supremacy	of	any	act	of	the	EU’s	shared	bodies	
over the constitution. 39 
The purpose of the theory 
Croatia	has	joined	the	European	Union	which	tremendously	differs	from	
the one for whose acceptance it had applied thirteen years ago. The Union has 
undergone enormous changes during the long decade from the crucial consti-
tutional	choice	made	by	the	Croatian	government	with	a	convincing	popular	
support	in	2001	by	joining	the	Stabilization	and	Accession	Agreement.
The most severe crisis of the Union which challenged even the very sur-
vival of the Union had brought previously unimaginable concerns about the 
fundamental objectives and unquestionable achievements of European inte-
grations.40	As	always	in	crisis	situations,	structures	of	power	within	the	Union	
as an association of formally equal states, has been altered. Instead of the pro-
cedures	prescribed	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	first	the	German-French	hegemony,	
first”,	he	makes	the	same	mistake	as	the	subsequent	founding	fathers	of	the	failed	
constitutional	convention	–	Joseph	H.	H.	Weiler:	The Constitution of Europe: “Do the 
New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	Cambridge	and	New	York,	1999,	pp.	3	–	4.
39	 The	authors	who	propose	the	term	“primacy”	instead	of	“supremacy”	seem	more	in	
accordance with the complexity of conventional solutions. On the face of it just a 
nuance, this is nevertheless an important distinction, a characteristic of constitu-
tional arrangements in complex states: there is no a priori assumption of supremacy 
of	European	law	over	the	constitutional	law	of	the	Member	State.	Leaning	on	the	
doctrine of constitutional identity, constitutional courts can eventually decide in 
favor	of	supremacy	of	national	law.	Allan	Rosas	and	Lorna	Armati:	EU Constitutio-
nal Law: An Introduction, Hart, Oxford et al.,	2010,	pp.	55	–	60.	
40 Statements on the possibility of a new war in Europe, coming not only from gener-
als	but	also	from	politicians,	indicated	the	state	of	mind	in	November	of	2011:	http://
danas.net.hr/svijet/page/	2011/12/11/0052006.html	(USA	general	M.	Dempsey	on	
the possibility of a breakup of the European union and war in Europe), http://
videoteka.novatv.hr/multimedia/ iz-vijesti-u-17-moguc-novi-rat-u-europi.html (Pol-
ish	Foreign	Minister	J.	Rostowski),	accessed	on	March	9,	2012.
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and later only of the first one, has been made transparent. The third important 
country faced the demands for referendum on withdrawal from the Union.
The crisis has unearthed the position of the leading powers towards the 
“constitutional	treaty”,	which	was	finally	won	in	2009,	upon	which	the	Union	
formally rests after the great reform which was initiated in 2001.41 We could 
consider the Lisbon Treaty tacite suspended as far as the basic ways and means 
of creating policy decisions were concerned.42 Despite the formally strengthened 
role of the national parliaments, even the significance of the European Parlia-
ment has been politically diminished during the crisis.43 Developments during 
the last four years including a formulation of the project of ‘a	banking	union’,	
require	us	to	reconsider	the	overall	Croatian	position	in	the	European	Union.44 
While	approaching	membership,	the	Croatian	internal	politics	has	already	
altered its orientation. The public became accustomed to the apologies from 
national politicians that certain unpopular measures had to be adopted simply 
“because	the	negotiators	so	demanded”.45 Often it resulted in adoption of un-
constitutional legislation, in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles 
of representative government.46 Important legislative project would have to 
be	previously	approved	by	the	European	Commission	experts,	even	when	the	
result of the actually dictated law was utter inefficiency.47 When serious disa-
41	 Siniša	Rodin,	Tamara	Ćapeta	and	Iris	Goldner	Lang	(eds.):	Reforma Europske Unije: 
Lisabonski ugovor (European Union Reform: The Treaty of Lisbon),	Narodne	novine,	Za-
greb, 2009. Especially see Robert Podolnjak: Od Laekena do Lisabona – uspon i pad 
ustavnog ugovora (From Laeken to Lisbon – the Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Treaty), 
in: ibid.,	pp.	27	–	65.
42	 This	is	what	the	new	president	of	the	European	Parliament	Martin	Schulz	repeat-
edly warns about since assuming the position in the fall of 2012. 
43	 Editorial	Comments:	Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic 
Union,	Common	Market	Law	Review,	Vol.	49,	No.	1,	2012,	pp.	1	–	14.	
44	 Pierre	Pâris	and	Charles	Wyplosz: The PADRE plan: politically acceptable debt restruc-
turing in the Eurozone,	 28	 January	 2014,	 http://www.voxeu.org/article/padre-plan-
politically-acceptable-debt-restructuring-eurozone,	accessed	on	March	11,	2014.	
45 Branko Smerdel: Pravo javnosti na pristup informacijama: monitoring treba nadzirati! 
(The Right of the Public to Know: Monitoring Must Be Monitored!), Informator: instruk-
tivno-informativni	list	za	ekonomska	i	pravna	pitanja,	No.	5975,	2011,	p.	3.
46 Branko Smerdel: O neustavnosti Zakona o sprečavanju sukoba interesa (On the unconsti-




tri-svakodnevno-hodocaste-Vandorenu.html	 (accessed	 on	March	 9,	 2012).	 Also,	
see	Globus	from	March	8,	2012,	p.	20.
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greements	occur,	even	the	democratic	legitimacy	of	the	Commission	and	other	
Union institutions has been questioned.48 This opens new questions about the 
meaning and a position of the national constitutions both in the network of 
the European pluralist constitutional system as in internal relations.49 
The	constitutional	basis	of	Croatian	Constitution’s	supremacy	over	Euro-




that is far from our purpose. The provisions of the constitution might be only 
the	last	defense	in	any	form	of	international	association.	Croatia	is	no	excepti-
on.	The	national	constitution	became	even	more	important	when	the	Croatian	




The new theory should be interpreted strictly as it was meant in the classic 
federalist theory. That is, the theory of the last resort, to be employed when 
national interests properly understood, should be protected by ultimate legal 
means. It is not ‘the	theory’	offered	to	any	government	of	the	time	to	disgu-
ise some disreputable political action. The worst case scenario of the newly 
established relationship opens the prospects for a new monitoring, and even 








claimed	 on	 July	 1,	 2013.	 Cf. http://vijesti.hrt.hr/razgovarali-milanovic-i-barroso-
vladin-non-paper-bruxellesu,	accessed	on	March	11,	2014.	
49	 A	 new	 EU	 Framework	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law,	 Brussels,	 11.3.2014,	
COM(2014)	158	final.	
50	 Rainer	Arnold:	Supremacy of the Constitution as the Basic Development in European Con-
stitutionalism,	in:	Igor	Kaučič	(ur.):	Dvajset	let	Ustave	Republike	Slovenije:	Pomen	
ustavnosti	 in	ustavna	demokracija	-	Twenty	years	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Re-
public of Slovenia: Significance of constitutionality and constitutional democracy, 
Pravna	fakulteta	Ljubljana,	Ustavno	sodišče	Republike	Slovenije,	Ljubljana,	2012.	
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zes our point. The principles of constitutionalism extent far beyond the case 




sely to the absence of a coherent doctrine on the relationships with the Euro-
pean	Union	among	the	Croatian	legal	scholars	and	a	reflection	of	such	neglect	
to the members of the power elite.51
The federalist attitude
As	the	constitutionalism	itself,	federal	communities	are	constructed	on	ar-
tificial, scientific knowledge and cost-benefit analyses, but not on ideological 
beliefs. This contradicts the ‘natural	and	simple’	logic	of	forcing	political	will	
of the strongest dominant partner, as common in history. Therefore, anyone 
entering such a community must pay attention to the interdisciplinary science 
on political associations. The significant body of knowledge has been accumu-
lated under the title of federal theory. Despite that, it seems to be neglected 
by the great part of the ‘European	law’	scholars.52	A	majority	of	the	most	pro-
minent theorists of federalism have tried to underline the dangers that lie in 
51	 Even	though	the	Constitution	was	amended	in	order	to	facilitate	the	implementa-
tion	 of	 the	EAW	decision,	 the	 ordinary	 law	 implementing	 the	 decision	 (the	 so-
called	 “lex	Perković”	 passed	 three	 days	 before	Croatia’s	 EU	 accession	 on	1	 July	






Commission	the	right	to	take	‘appropriate measures in the event of serious short-
comings’.	In	an	attempt	to	avoid	a	rift	with	the	EU	just	months	after	joining,	Parlia-
ment adopted further amendments in October 2013, changing the restrictions on 
the	use	of	the	EAW	and	making	it	applicable	to	all	criminal	offences,	regardless	of	
when	they	were	perpetrated.	The	new	law	entered	into	force	on	1	January	2014.
52 We do not assume being exclusive in emphasizing the enormous importance of the 
classic federalist theory. This kind of warnings has been present, but in a surpris-
ingly scarce extent. The first group of scientists arguing in favor of interdisciplinary 
approach are so called ‘Tocquevillians’-	 see	 Larry	 Siedetop:	Democracy in Europe, 
Penguin,	London,	2000;	 the	other	are	 rather	exceptional	 ‘comparativists’	among	
the	European	constitutionalists	–	see	Robert	Schutze:	Federalism and Constitutional 
Pluralism: a letter from America,	in:	Matej	Avbelj	and	Jan	Komarek	(eds.):	Constitu-
tional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Hart, Oxford, 2012, pp. 185 
–	212.	It	has	just	been	neglected	in	Croatia.
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an intuitive inclination towards those who seek a rapid integration by force.53 
The advantages of complex forms of association lie in accommodation of diffe-
rent identities ensured through institutional means and are cultivating politics 
within and between states. Philosopher Denis de Rougement, connecting the 
federal principle and democracy as alternatives to threatening totalitarianism, 
warns:	“Totalitarianism	is	simple	and	rigid	like	war,	like	death.	Federalism	is	
complex	and	flexible,	like	peace,	like	life.	And	since	it	is	simple	and	rigid,	to-
talitarianism is a constant temptation for our weariness, anxieties, doubts and 
misfortunes	stemming	from	a	spiritual	resignation.	A	totalitarian	spirit	is	not	
dangerous only because it triumphs in a handful of states and makes a fast or 
slower advance in all others, but especially because it spoils all of us, in the 
heart of our thoughts, at the very least constraining our vitality, courage and 
life’s	purpose.”54 
Political processes in complex associations of states constantly generate 
specific political problems and issues that are to be dealt with in a way tai-
lored to the application and maintenance of the federal principle. This is the 
very essence of federal solutions, with their imminent ambivalence between 
the demand for joining a wider association and the imperative of preserving 
autonomy	and	 identity	 in	such	a	union.	American	author	Martin	Diamond	
summarized	 this	 in	 the	 following	way:	 “The	distinguishing	 characteristic	of	
federalism is the peculiar ambivalence of the ends men seek to make it serve... 
Federalism is always an arrangement pointed in two contrary directions or 
aimed at securing two contrary ends. One end is always found in the reason 
why the member units do not simply consolidate themselves into one large 
unitary	country;	the	other	end	is	always	found	in	the	reason	why	the	member	
units do not choose to remain simply small wholly autonomous countries. 
The natural tendency of any political community, whether large or small, is to 
completeness, to the perfection of its autonomy. Federalism is the effort deli-
berately to modify that tendency. Hence any given federal structure is always 
the institutional expression of the contradiction or tension between the parti-
53 Branko Smerdel: Neki komparativni problemi primjene federalizma (A few comparative prob-
lems in the application of federalism),	Naša	zakonitost,	No.	9,	1986,	pp.	1137	–	1145;	
Branko Smerdel: Politika, pravna znanost i aktualni problemi jugoslavenskog federalizma 
(Politics, legal science and current problems of Yugoslav federalism),	Naše	 teme,	No.	7-8,	
1986,	pp.	38	–	52.
54 Denis De Rougement: L’ attitude Federaliste, cited in: David R. Herron: The Ends of 
American Federalism: an European Perspective, South-Western	Political	Science	Asso-
ciation	Meeting,	Fort	Worth,	Texas,	March	22,	1973,	p.	30.
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cular reasons the member units have for remaining small and autonomous but 
not wholly, and large and consolidated but not quite. The differences among 
federal systems result from the differences of these pair of reasons for wanting 
federalism.”55
These	assertions	are	important	in	order	for	us	to	clarify	the	Euro	realists’	
position that the European Union is neither some kind of a new type of asso-
ciation, where the iron laws of international and internal policies would no 
longer apply, nor it is some kind of a new type of a historically unprecedented 
political system. It is a complex association of states founded on federalist 
principles56, having its historical predecessors and comparative examples and 
as such it should be understood, studied and considered while preparing to 
participate in. In this, it is of great importance that we should not disregard hi-
storical experience, as well as the accomplishments of domestic thought. Such 
an approach we consider ‘a	realist	one’,	because	it	advocates	accession	to	the	
European Union, in full familiarity of its advantages. Those are first and fore-
most	expressed	by	the	original	slogan	“peace	and	prosperity”,	as	well	as	of	its	
true nature and problems it generates. Realism does not mean hostility towar-
ds association57, but instead demands understanding of the complexity and 
fragility of federalist institutional complexes.58 That understanding is therefore 
necessary in accession to complex associations, as well as in their maintenance. 
Excessive expectations lead to great disappointments and often tragedies as 
well.59 
55	 Martin	Diamond:	The Ends of Federalism,	Publius,	Vol.	3,	No.	2,	1973,	p.	130.
56 The federal principle is fundamental to associations of equal entities, wherein the 
law	 ensures	 equality	 and	 preservation	 of	 identity	 of	 the	 complex	 association’s	
member	states.	Federation	is	only	one	example	of	applying	this	principle	–	Branko	
Smerdel, in: Branko Smerdel and Smiljko Sokol: Ustavno pravo (Constitutional Law), 
Narodne	novine,	Zagreb,	2009,	pp.	409	–	436.	Also	see	Branko	Smerdel:	Relevance 
of the Political Theory of a Compound Republic for the European Integration: Toward a 
Theory of Constitutional Choice,	Workshop	 in	 Political	 Theory	&	 Policy	 Analysis,	
Indiana University, Bloomington, 2006.
57	 Likewise,	“Euroscepticism”	also	does	not	mean	hostility	towards	the	Union,	as	has	
become common to claim during the propaganda on the accession referendum.
58	 Lidija	Basta	Fleiner	and	Jean-Francois	Gaudreault-DesBiens:	Federalism and Autono-
my,	 in:	 Mark	 Tushnet,	 Thomas	 Fleiner	 and	 Cheryl	 Saunders	 (eds.):	 Routledge	
Handbook	of	Constitutional	Law,	Routledge,	London	and	New	York,	2013,	pp.	
143	–	158.	
59 Smerdel, B. (ed.), op. cit. (fn 13). 
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Conclusion
Each member state is obliged to observe the EU law as provided by the 
agreements on membership, i.e. up to the limits of the principle of rule of 
law. But	no	member	 state	 should	be	 required	 to	 renounce	 its	Constitution,	
accepting a total supremacy of all the sources of the Union law, in advance 
and with no reservations. This goes in particular for the erroneous approach 
according	 to	which	 the	 “constitutional	 domain	 reserve”	 applies	 only	 to	 the	
core	countries,	at	the	first	place	Germany	and	France,	and	not	to	the	smaller	
and	newer	members.	We	are	not	equally	powerful,	but	we	have	equal	rights.	At	
the root of these doubts, there is a different understanding of the constitution 
and constitutionality. For positivists, the constitution is an act of regulation 
just like any other such act, for the subscribers of the today suppressed hi-
storical school of jurisprudence it is a text trying to summarize the historical 
experience of a people in its struggle for natural rights.60	As	the	supreme	act	of	
the national legal system, the constitution rules not only within the domain of 
courts of justice. By limiting our research to the jurisprudence of the European 
court, we are denied a necessary deeper insight into a reality of relations in 
the compound community of nations.61 The most comprehensive analyses of 
the case-law unearth only a part of the phenomenon called legal order, which 
must	include	an	insight	into	the	ways	and	modalities	of	implementation.	An	
appraisal of the whole requires a wider interdisciplinary approach than the one 
enabled by legal positivism dominating the study of constitutionality in the 
European Union.62 
60	 This	also	enables	the	ease	with	which	the	preamble	of	the	Croatian	Constitution	
has been amended and retailored. Positivists do not understand demands for ac-
knowledgement of historical experience in the function of prediction. For an inter-
esting analysis of the dispute see Harold Berman: World Law: An Ecumenical Jursipru-
dence of the Holy Spirit,	Emory	Public	Law	Research	Paper	No.	05-4,	February	2005,	
pp.	6	–	7,	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=666143,	accessed	on	March	25,	2014.
61 This assertion does in no way underestimates the importance of our new, positivis-
tic	European	 law	 theory	 that	has	 successfully	 fit	 in	 the	European	and	American	
trends, but aims to integrate it into an interdisciplinary approach which has already 
been developed. On the development of the newer judicial theory and practice see 
extensively Siniša Rodin: Ustavni protekcionizam i nacionalni identitet (Constitutional 
protectionism and national identity),	in:	Arsen	Bačić	(ed.):	Ustavna	teorija:	strani	utjec-
aji i hrvatski odgovori (Constitutional Theory: Foreign influences and Croatian responses), 
Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, Zagreb, 2012.
62	 Citing	European	court	decisions	Costa v. Enel from 1964 and Simmenthal from 1977, 
some authors have rushed to conclude that the European constitution had been 
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In every form of association of states, the national constitution represents 
the final guarantee of identity preservation, which is in itself a condition of 
accession to any association of states. The attitude of the powerful towards 
the European constitution as well as towards the hard-won Lisbon Treaty and 
the newly established institutions calls for caution. This is why we should be 
aware of the examples of numerous EU members, not just the large or old ones, 




wherein advantage might belong to domestic constitutional law, instead of the 
theory of a total supremacy of all sources of European law over national law.63 
already in existence at the end of the last century. For example, see Koenraad Len-
aerts,	 Piet	Van	Nuffel	 and	Robert	Bray	 (eds.):	Constitutional Law of the European 
Union,	Sweet	and	Maxwell,	London,	1999.
63 With in principle very significant, but with no politically problematic effects. See 
Theresa Donovan: Germany Constitutional Court affirms Euro zone bailout,	 Jurist,	
14.03.2014., at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/03/germany-constitutional-court-
affirms-euro-zone-bailout-decision.php,	accessed	on	March	25,	2014.
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Sažetak
Branko Smerdel *64
U POTRAZI ZA DOKTRINOM: HRVATSKI USTAVNI 
IDENTITET U EUROPSKOJ UNIJI
Ulazak Republike Hrvatske u europski pravni sustav otvorio je niz teorijskih 
kontroverzi i rasprava u pravnoj javnosti. U radu se obrađuje jedna od njih – problem 
ustavnog identiteta. I danas postoje tendencije izjednačavanja federalističkog načela 
i federativne države te posljedično odbacivanje federalizma kao ostvarivog načela. U 
vezi s dvjema pogrešnim ideološkim interpretacijama Europske unije – jedne prema 
kojoj je riječ o sustavu kojim dominira samodostatna birokracija, ili suprotne, prema 
kojoj je riječ o zajednici utemeljenoj na povjerenju i altruizmu – naglašava se važnost 
pravilnog razumijevanja pojma ustavnog identiteta. Među ostalim značenjima ustavnog 
identiteta je i ono o “preostalom suverenitetu” u složenoj zajednici država. Stoga je 
važno, iako zanemareno, stvoriti novu pravnu teoriju radi jačanja vladavine prava, 
kao i jasnog definiranja realističnih načela prednosti prava Europske unije nad 
nacionalnim ustavima. Takva teorija ne može biti utemeljena na čisto pravnom, već 
samo na interdisciplinarnom pristupu, koji bi uzeo u obzir niz izvanpravnih čimbenika 
koji određuju dinamiku odnosa unutar složenog sustava različitih razina ustavnosti 
u EU-u. Pri tome ne smiju biti zaboravljena postignuća federalističke teorije koja je 
prožimala ideje utemeljitelja europskih integracija. Pogreške hrvatske Vlade i spor u 
koji je ušla s Europskom komisijom na početku hrvatskog članstva u EU-u pokazale su 
nužnost takve realistične teorije ustavnog identiteta. S obzirom na nejasnoće koje postoje 
glede tog pitanja i u drugim zemljama, problemi s kojima se susreće najnovija članica 
mogu biti važni i za njihova daljnja razjašnjenja u ostalim članicama EU-a.
Ključne riječi: Europska unija, ustavni identitet, čisti legalizam, federalno načelo, 
federacija, složena zajednica, Hrvatska
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